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I .  OVERVIEW
Indonesia is making some headway in countering violent extremism but not through govern-
ment programs.  Some prisoners have moderated their views through discussions with fellow 
inmates and their own self-awareness. Communities have taken back radical mosques on their 
own without help from counter-terrorism agencies. In general, the twin goals of “deradicalisa-
tion” (persuading extremists, especially prisoners convicted of terrorism, to move away from 
violence) and “counter-radicalisation” (immunising communities against extremist ideology 
and preventing new recruitment) have not been well-served by top-down programs heavy on 
rhetoric and formal meetings, divorced from detailed knowledge of radical networks. The chal-
lenge is to understand when, why and how individuals and communities resist on their own and 
see if there are any lessons that can be replicated.
The National Anti-Terrorism Agency (Badan Nasional untuk Penanggulangan Terorisme, 
BNPT) has not been as effective as hoped. Some of its problems on the prevention side are not 
of its own making. There is still no consensus in the broader Muslim community about what 
constitutes extremism; radicalism in defence of the faith is considered laudable in many quar-
ters. The BNPT structure effectively puts the police in charge of intelligence and operations and 
the military in charge of prevention, which does not make for smooth cooperation. All the 
law enforcement officers with direct field experience went to the first, leaving prevention to 
newcomers who had no personal knowledge of networks, prisoners or available data. Preven-
tion officials still complain that funds have been slow in coming, hampering their work. Many 
agencies and ministries that BNPT is supposed to be coordinating have little interest either in 
the subject of countering extremism or in being coordinated.
Questions remain, however, over BNPT’s ability to target programs effectively. In its 2014 
“National Program for Preventing Terrorism” for example, BNPT identifies prisons, mosques, 
schools and media as the key areas for work. These are the right areas, but the activities proposed 
are mostly meetings and generic training of trainers without honing in on particular institutions 
and individuals known to be propagating extremism. The design of prevention programs could 
benefit from more systematic study of the case dossiers of the almost 800 individuals indicted 
on terrorism charges since 2002. It could also benefit from better analysis of the ideological 
arguments used against violence within the radical community that some convicted terrorists 
have found persuasive and more in-depth study of successful cases of community rejection of 
radical teachings.
This report examines the government prevention program to date while also looking at 
examples of non-government and community-based initiatives to counter violent extremism. 
When well-planned and implemented, the latter can be very effective, but in some cases, they 
turn into exercises in vigilantism that are as ugly when mobilised against extremists as when 
directed against religious minorities. BNPT’s programs to date may be weak but a national agen-
cy is still needed to coordinate and share information across agencies; develop policies designed 
to discourage advocacy of violence; and help community leaders develop strategies. Unless 
programs in all of these areas are based on detailed knowledge about how and where radical-
isation takes place, however, they are not likely to be productive. As a new government takes 
office later this year, it might consider a restructuring of BNPT to remove the divide between 
intelligence/operations and prevention.
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II .  BACKGROUND TO THE GOVERNMENT PROGRAM
From the 2002 Bali bombing until the early years of the Yudhoyono administration, “deradi-
calisation” was left to the counter-terrorism police, Detachment 88.1 It was ad hoc and largely 
off budget, aimed at terrorist detainees and suspects. Prisoners who were seen as cooperative 
received all-expenses-paid family visits, better food, good medical treatment, school fees for 
their children and even periodic outings. In a few cases, the police financed weddings, allowing 
imprisoned jihadis to marry their girlfriends in prison ceremonies, with family members flown 
in for the occasion. Anonymous donors provided the funding. There was no systematic attempt 
at counseling, although police encouraged a few senior JI prisoners who expressed remorse or 
denounced the bombings to talk with other inmates and publish accounts of their own personal 
trajectories into and out of violence.2 
These efforts brought some notable individual successes and made Indonesia a showcase for 
“deradicalisation” efforts. Police officers involved recognised that understanding radicalisation 
was key and that building relationships with prisoners needed certain personal qualities: opera-
tional experience, empathy, good listening skills and an understanding of the culture of radical 
networks.3 The emphasis on these skills, however, meant that there was less analysis of the men 
who “successfully” disengaged, many of whom were uncomfortable with targeting civilians or 
waging jihad on Indonesian soil in the first place. Even without the police input, some might 
have pulled away on their own, particularly those who joined as combatants in local conflicts 
which have since been resolved, or those who played largely peripheral, non-violent roles: hid-
ing fugitives, withholding information or disposing of evidence.
The counter-terrorism police guarded their contacts and information closely, partly for secu-
rity reasons but also perhaps because the information was an important source of political cap-
ital and prestige. There was no inclination to work closely with other agencies, many of which 
they viewed with contempt. This was particularly true of the prison system, where some in De-
tachment 88 saw the possibility that all their good work cultivating contacts would be undone 
once convicted terrorists were transferred from police custody to regular prisons that were no-
toriously corrupt and understaffed.4 But as time went on, some lower-level prison officials, un-
noticed and unrecognised, were building their own ties to prisoners and developing an interest 
in inmate networks. Their knowledge could have made for a potent partnership with police in 
understanding and preventing prison recruitment as well as reinforcing deradicalisation efforts, 
but institutional obstacles were too great. 
No real attention to broader prevention efforts took place until President Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono took office, just weeks after the 2004 Australian embassy bombing. After the second 
1 For more details on the origins of the program, see International Crisis Group, “Deradicalisation” and Indonesian Prisons, 
Asia Report No.142, 19 November 2007. Note that while many other countries have abandoned the use of the terms “derad-
icalisation” in favour of “disengagement”, and “counter-radicalisation” in favour of “countering violent extremism (CVE)”, 
the old words remain in general usage in Indonesia.
2 Nasir Abas, a veteran of Afghanistan and Mindanao and commander of Jemaah Islamiyah’s Region 3, and Ali Imron, a 
religious scholar from Lamongan who joined his two brothers, Amrozi and Mukhlas, in the Bali bombing plot, were the 
most senior prisoners to agree to work with the police. Ali Imron received a life sentence for his role (his brothers were exe-
cuted); Nasir was given a short sentence for withholding information and was released after a brief sentence. Between 2003 
and 2007, he frequently accompanied the police on operations and visited prisons on their behalf to meet with inmates and 
distribute largesse. But it was never a systematic program, and Nasir by his own account said he only visited prisons off Java 
once or twice and only went to Cipinang, the main prison in Jakarta, four or five times in total before police decided to use 
other channels. See “Prison De-Radicalisation and Disengagement: The Case of Indonesia”, unpublished paper prepared 
for a conference run by The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, October 2009. The 
case study was incorporated into a Peter R. Neumann,“Prisons and Terrorism: Radicalisation and De-Radicalisation in 15 
Countries”, ICSR, London, 2010.
3 Powerpoint presentation by Tito Karnavian, “The Attempt to De-radicalize Islamist Terrorists in Indonesia”, Japan-ASEAN 
Integration Fund Seminar, May 2011.
4 See International Crisis Group,‘”Deradicalisation’ and Indonesian prisons”, op.cit.
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Bali bombing in 2005, followed within a month by the beheading of three Christian schoolgirls 
in Poso, Central Sulawesi, then Vice-President Jusuf Kalla summoned Muslim religious leaders, 
including several hardliners, to his residence to discuss how to counter the appeal of violence 
and martyrdom. They formed a short-lived group called the Team for Handling Terrorism (Tim 
Penanggulangan Teror, TPT) but many of its members were convinced that the U.S. was a big-
ger threat than Indonesian extremists, and it never evolved into a serious community outreach 
effort. 
Between 2005 and 2009, Indonesia had no major bombings, and, after police in 2007 man-
aged to dismantle—temporarily, as it turned out—a major terrorist base in Poso, Indonesia was 
hailed as “one of world’s few triumphs in fighting terrorism”.5 But the success was almost all in 
terms of law enforcement, not prevention, and the assumed correlation between the lull in at-
tacks and effective countermeasures proved false. The suicide bombings in July 2009 at two ma-
jor Jakarta hotels, and the discovery of a plot against President Yudhoyono led the government 
to fast-track the creation of what became BNPT. It was established by presidential decree on 16 
July 2010, almost a year to the day after the hotel bombings, and began work in September.
The shock of the 2009 attacks convinced the president and many in his inner circle that par-
ticularly with the plot against the president, terrorism was now a matter of state security, and the 
military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) needed to be involved. BNPT therefore would be 
an agency that transcended the police-military divide, and one of the senior roles in the BNPT 
would be reserved for an army officer. The new agency had three divisions: operations, which 
worked closely with counter-terrorism police to coordinate intelligence-gathering, monitoring 
and arrests; prevention, protection and deradicalisation; and international cooperation. The 
police were not about to cede their operational role to the military, and with a diplomat head-
ing the international cooperation effort, the TNI was left with prevention. Major-General Agus 
Surya Bakti, a former army intelligence officer and rising star in Kopassus, was put in charge, 
with a civilian academic heading the deradicalisation effort under him.
III .  BNPT AND THE TERRORISM PREVENTION COORDINATION FORUMS (FKPT) 
Prevention got off to a very slow start. From the beginning it was hampered by the lack of a 
good knowledge base. Part of the problem, as noted, was structural. It was the operational side 
of BNPT—police officers who had been working to disrupt radical networks and arrest those re-
sponsible for violence—that had all the institutional knowledge and ongoing intelligence need-
ed to think through useful strategies for disengagement. The Yudhoyono administration may 
have had its own political reasons for trying to find a counter-terrorism role for the military, but 
it made little sense to turn over prevention work to people who had no experience tracking or 
studying these groups when there were several police officers who had spent a decade doing just 
that. Dividing operations and prevention between police and military meant from the start that 
there would be obstacles to cooperation, regardless of the professionalism of the division heads 
concerned. 
The lack of experience was compounded by weak research. Rather than systematically read-
ing through interrogation depositions or trial documents to understand how and where con-
victed terrorists had become radicalised so that any de-radicalisation projects could be better 
targeted, BNPT staff tended to prefer consulting with partners, many of whom had very differ-
ent understandings of what constituted “extremism.” These partners included Nahdlatul Ulama, 
the Council of Indonesian Ulama (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI), the Ministry of Religion and 
several non-governmental institutes. For Nahdlatul Ulama, non-violent salafism—the ultra-pu-
5  Joshua Kurlantzick, “Doing It Indonesia’s Way”, Time, 9 August 2007.
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ritan stream of Islam practiced in Saudi Arabia—was a bigger threat than terrorism because 
its followers condemned traditional Nahdlatul Ulama practices as un-Islamic.6 The prevention 
division did commission research, but often without a clear idea of what it was looking for or 
how to use the results.
In January 2011, the prevention division produced a strategic plan for 2010-2014. It included 
a discussion of the causes of terrorism in Indonesia:
The problem of a weak sense of nationhood; a narrow-fanatic understanding of reli-
gious teachings; the weakness of citizenship education; the erosion of local values by 
a wave of negative modernisation; and lack of coordination and integration of efforts 
to prevent terrorism have all made radical thought and action a more serious threat...
The fact that “weak sense of nationhood” came first was revealing because it fit well with a 
military’s vision of its own task as protecting and safeguarding national sovereignty. But there 
was little assessment of how threats had changed over time or acknowledgment that the moti-
vations of someone in a former conflict area like Poso could be different from those who had 
joined the militant training camp in Aceh a year earlier. In fact there was no reference at all to 
the Aceh camp, when that incident, more than any other, both underscored how extremist alli-
ances had changed and drew attention to the problem of recidivism among released prisoners.7
The document set four goals that it hoped would be 80 per cent achieved by 2014: 
• raising awareness and vigilance through dissemination of information, training and anti- 
terrorist propaganda; 
• protecting “vital objects”, residential areas and public places from acts of terrorism; 
• reducing radical ideology and propaganda; and 
• preventing communities from being influenced by  radical ideologies and persuading con-
victed terrorists, their families and networks to disengage from terrorism.8
The goals were right; there was just little idea of how to achieve them, and some of the early 
efforts were not well thought through (for example, holding shadow-puppet performances in 
prisons to try and attract radicals back to traditional Javanese culture). 
When BNPT did have good, concrete ideas—for example, a proposal to certify clerics and 
preachers—they were often shot down by Islamic organisations, concerned that they would stig-
matise Islam. The objections to certification or government review of Friday sermons (khutbah) 
came from moderates and hardliners alike.9
Throughout 2011 and 2012, a series of plots by a variety of small extremist cells drove home 
the fact that while the level of terrorist competence had declined and the threat of major attacks 
had receded, there was still no shortage of recruits.  No public campaign or outreach program 
was in place. To fill the gap, BNPT came up in 2012 with the idea of Terrorism Prevention Co-
ordination Forums (Forum Koordinasi Pencegahan Terorisme, FKPT). 
In some ways, it was the New Order mindset: create a national formula to be applied uni-
formly across the country to mobilise citizens for a particular cause.  BNPT provided the general 
6 See for example Syaikh Idraham, Mereka Memalsukan Kitab-Kitab Karya Ulama Klasik: Episode Kebohongan Publik Sekte 
Salafi Wahabi, Yogyakarta, 2011. This anti-Wahabi tract has an introduction by Said Agil Siraj, the head of Nahdlatul Ula-
ma.
7 Among other things, the constellation of groups at the camp showed that Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT), founded by Abu 
Bakar Ba’asyir in 2008, and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), which he led from 1999 until his arrest in late 2002, were now in oppos-
ing camps. JI was vilified by all the groups present in Aceh for having abandoned jihad.
8 BNPT, “Rencana Strategis Deputi Bidang Pencegahan, Perlindungan dan Deradikalisasi”.
9 See, for example, “Djoko: Deradikalisasi Tak Terkait Agama Tertentu”, vivanews.com, 10 September 2012.
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direction, usually in a launching ceremony in a local hotel with provincial government officials 
and local notables in attendance. After a few motivational speeches, the provincial FKPT would 
be launched, consisting of clerics, youth organisations, academics and civil society leaders.10 
By mid-2014, there were FKPTs in 23 provinces and plans to extend them to all 34.11 In each 
province, the liaison to the FKPT from the local government is the office of political affairs and 
national unity (kesatuan bangsa dan politik, kesbangpol).
Each FKPT was encouraged to host “Terrorism Prevention Dialogues”, with participants rep-
resenting both “moderates” and “radicals” as well as religious bodies such as the local branch of 
the Indonesian Ulama Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI).12 Each dialogue would have 
facilitators with in-depth religious knowledge and a good understanding of radical thought, 
who would undergo a three-day training program by BNPT. 
According to a syllabus drafted in Jakarta, dialogue participants would discuss general con-
cepts of radicalism and terrorism, as well as causes and possible solutions. It would then move 
on to a discussion of terrorism in Indonesia, looking at specific incidents, the perpetrators, the 
root factors, the relevant laws and steps toward prevention. The next topic would be religion and 
terrorism, exploring how religious teachings could be misinterpreted to ill effect and the role 
that religious teachers could play in deradicalisation. This would be followed by a discussion on 
Islam and extremism. The final topic was to be on religion and the state, including a discussion 
of concepts of the state in Islam, the relationship between Islam and the state in Indonesia and 
the value of heterogeneity (drafters avoided the word “pluralism”) in building a strong nation.13 
The initial goal was to have dialogues in ten provinces by the end of 2014; halfway through the 
year because of budget constraints, the goal had been lowered to eight.14
With the right facilitators, these discussions might be useful as a way of imparting infor-
mation, but the chances were never very high that committed extremists would take part. The 
programs that have taken place to date have ended up largely preaching to the converted, so that, 
for example, the “dialogue” run by the Banten FKPT in April 2014 concluded with the issuing of 
a “Declaration of Peace-Loving High-School and College Students”.15 Discussions in high-end 
hotels were not the best format for challenging key points of the extremist narrative. And while 
many were willing to make a stand against terrorism in the abstract, it was not at all clear that 
local religious leaders were willing to take on extremist clerics in their own communities, or 
that the FKPTs could provide tactical guidance if they were. Without a targeted local strategy 
to identify problem areas and institutions; determine what communities were vulnerable to re-
cruitment and why, and identify who might have legitimacy in countering extremist messages, 
the FKPTs appeared to be little more than cheerleaders for moderation and Indonesian unity.
In an interview in May 2014, Maj. Gen. Agus Surya Bakti acknowledged that the FKPTs were 
largely powerless but he put it down in part to the fact that they had no budget of their own. 
Any funds for activities would have to be provided by the local government or outside donors.16 
10 For example, on 4-5 April 2012, BNPT, working with the Nusa Institute, held a two-day workshop to launch the FKPT for 
Nusa Tenggara Barat province. Before an audience of about 150, BNPT head Ansyad Mbai gave a pep talk titled “Reject 
and Oppose!” (Menolak dan Melawan). Nasaruddin Umar spoke on “The Effectiveness of Preventing Radical Terrorism 
Using Local Knowledge”. A month later, a similar event took place in Lampung to launch the provincial FKPT there, with 
a one-day seminar called “Optimalizing the Function of Social Institutions and Local Knowledge in the Effort to Prevent 
Terrorism.” Similar programs took place in North Sumatra, West Java and East Kalimantan.
11 IPAC interview, Maj.Gen Agus Surya Bakti, Jakarta, 5 May 2014.
12 “Draf Final Pedoman Pelaksanaan Dialog Pencegahan Terorisme” 2014.
13 “Pluralism” is seen by many conservative Muslim groups as a principle that all religions are equally true, which they reject.
The Indonesian Ulama Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI) issued a fatwa against pluralism, liberalism and secular-
ism in 2005.
14 IPAC interview, Irfan Idris, BNPT, Jakarta, 5 June 2014.
15 “Pelajar Rawan Direkrut Teroris” Banten Pos, 26 Mei 2014.
16 IPAC interview, 26 May 2014.
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Funding was not the only problem, however. Asked what the FKPT could do if it came to a 
member’s attention that an extremist study group was taking place at a local mosque, Maj. Gen. 
Agus suggested that members might approach the cleric responsible. But what self-respecting 
extremist would listen to a representative from a government-organised body that was already 
branded in radical circles as anti-Islamic? There was no plan to work out policies with the local 
government, for example, banning preaching that encouraged hatred and violence and prevent-
ing government-funded institutions from being used for such purposes. There was no effort 
even to develop a list of clerics known from interrogation depositions to have been instrumental 
in radicalisation. 
IV. DERADICALISATION AND COUNTER-RADICALISATION 2013-2014
Since 2013, prevention efforts have included developing a national terrorism prevention strate-
gy; following through on programs outlined in the November 2013 Deradicalisation Blueprint; 
building a new “deradicalisation centre” outside Jakarta in Sentul, West Java; and bringing over 
Middle Eastern scholars who it is hoped will be able to moderate the views of extremist prison-
ers.
A. The Deradicalisation Blueprint and the National Terrorism Prevention Program
In November 2013, after many fits and starts, BNPT, working with the Nusa Institute, a non-gov-
ernmental think-tank set up specifically to counter religious radicalism in Indonesia, finally 
came up with a 122-page Deradicalisation Blueprint, but it was extremely general. It focused on 
the need for broad tasks of collecting data on radical prisoners, then providing rehabilitation, 
“re-education”, and reintegration, with monitoring and evaluation of every step. Indicators of 
success were to be a rise in moral awareness of convicted terrorists and their families; a change 
in their attitudes away from radicalism toward inclusiveness, openness, and commitment to 
peaceful and humanitarian values; growth of feelings of patriotism; and an awareness of the 
error of their ways.17 There were no specifics and no attempt to derive suggestions for deradi-
calisation or counter-radicalisation from knowledge of how radicalisation in different areas or 
among different groups had occurred in the first place.  There was also no sense in the Blueprint, 
or indeed in any other of the numerous booklets produced by the prevention division, of violent 
extremism as a dynamic, constantly evolving threat.18
The Blueprint fed into a National Terrorism Prevention Program (Program Nasional Pence-
gahan Terorisme, PNPT), the outcome of two years of work. It was supposed to reflect input 
from all of the line ministries that BNPT was coordinating but few had much interest in the task. 
The only contribution the Education Ministry could make, for example, was to suggest that it be 
responsible for “character-building” of Indonesian students. The Information and Communica-
tion Ministry was also unresponsive, sending junior officials to meetings, if they sent anyone at 
all. Nevertheless, a PNPT task force was set up, to be headed by the deputy minister of religion, 
17 Deputi Bidang Pencegahan, Perlindungan dan Deradikalisasi, Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, “Blueprint De-
radikalisasi”, Jakarta, 2013, p.75.
18 See for example “Perkembangan Terorisme di Indonesia”, a 108-page booklet published by the prevention division in 2013 
that consists of odd chunks of description of different groups, divided into three categories: radical militias, radical sepa-
ratists and radical terrorists. The difference between the first and the others is that radical militias, represented by Laskar 
Jihad, Laskar Mujahidin and Laskar Jundullah,  remain loyal to the Indonesian state. Darul Islam is included in radical sep-
aratists, together with the Free Papua Movement,  while radical terrorists include JI, the MILF and al-Qaeda. The booklet 
includes at the end a table of “Terrorist Actions against the NKRI” [the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia] which 
starts in 1948 with the Madiun Rebellion up through a telephoned bomb threat against the Soekarno-Hatta airport in April 
2013 but includes nothing from 1984 to 1998 (no reference to Lampung in 1989); nothing from July 2006 to July 2009 (no 
reference to Poso or Palembang) and no mention of the Aceh training camp in February 2010. 
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Nasaruddin Umar, whose Nusa Institute had helped draw up the Blueprint and was a frequent 
partner in convening the FKPTs. Other members represented relevant ministries.19 Its first 
meeting was in early June 2014 and the main priority was to draw up a workplan so that funds 
already made available in the national budget could be released by the Ministry of Finance.20
The plan now is to focus on the thirteen provinces most affected by radicalism and terror-
ism, with a mapping undertaken in each province on the potential for radicalism.21 Activities 
envisaged included strengthening the capacity of mosques, religious schools (pesantren), high 
schools and universities to resist terrorism; supporting mass media projects with anti-terrorism 
themes; and holding peace dialogues with Middle Eastern ulama in prisons and on national 
television. On the deradicalisation side, prisoners, ex-prisoners and their families would be em-
powered through entrepreneurial training and other programs.22 
The programs, some of which are already underway even without the mapping, have some 
odd metrics. Thus, 91 mosques across the thirteen provinces are to receive “entrepreneurial as-
sistance” of Rp.3 million ($250) a month for one year. It is not clear how the mosques are to be 
selected or how such assistance will be used. The expected outcome, however, is that 90 per cent 
of them will be better able to stand on their own economically (and thus presumably not rely on 
extermal donors that might be supportive of extremism).23 
The pesantren project will involve the training of 60 trainers in each province, and prepara-
tion of a terrorism prevention “module”, with 3,000 to be produced for use in pesantrens after 
the trainers return home. The expected outcome is that 100 per cent of the modules will be dis-
tributed, and 80 per cent of the participants will improve their understanding in how to resist 
terrorism.24 If the modules were carefully prepared with the content checked by external experts, 
tested in focus groups and adapted to local contexts, perhaps they might have an impact, but it 
is not clear that any such procedures are planned. 
It is not clear how any of the proposed programs are designed to respond to problems of the 
moment: recruitment of Indonesians for Syria, for example. The program aimed at universities 
proposes to train 575 trainers from among students and faculties but Indonesian campuses gen-
erally have not been a particular focus of violent extremists, in part because non-violent groups 
like Hizbut Tahrir and the Prosperous Justice Party ( Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS), with their 
very strong campus-based networks, have shut them out. What groups exactly are these trainers 
going to be taught to resist and how is the distinction going to be made between acceptable and 
non-acceptable extremism? If Jemaah Islamiyah is engaged in a renewed effort to recruit on 
campus, what kinds of teachings or programs should the trainers look for and what should they 
do if they suspect such recruitment is taking place?  This is the kind of information that would 
be useful; a generic module that goes through the history of terrorism in Indonesia and extrem-
ist interpretations of jihad is less likely to have an impact.
B. The Sentul Deradicalisation Centre
In 2011, BNPT officials began talking of the need for a maximum security detention centre for 
terrorists but the concept changed over time. By 2012, an arrangement had been worked out 
19 The ministries included are the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal and Security Affairs;Religious Affairs; Education; 
Information;  and Law and Human Rights. Also included are the National Planning Agency; the Vice-Presidential Secre-
tariat; and the Presidential Working Unit for Supervision and Management of Development (UKP4).
20 IPAC interview, Irfan Idris, 5 June 2014.
21 These were West Java, Banten, DKI Jakarta; Central Java, East Java, Aceh, North Sumatra, Lampung, South Sulawesi, Cen-
tral Sulawesi, Maluku, South Kalimantan and West Nusa Tenggara.
22 “Program Nasional Pencegahan Terorisme”, powerpoint presentation by BNPT, Jakarta, January 2014.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
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with the military to build a deradicalisation centre in Sentul, West Java as part of a larger mili-
tary training complex called the Indonesia Peace and Security Centre (IPSC). Plans for the phys-
ical plant, built at a cost of Rp.160.8 billion ($13.6 million) for the deradicalisation centre alone, 
went ahead before much thinking was done about its purpose.25 There was no consultation with 
the Corrections Directorate of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights (hereafter referred to as 
Corrections), according to its staff, some of whom wanted help in dealing with hardcore ideo-
logues. They thought that a maximum security prison in Sentul would have been a great way of 
keeping them in isolation and transferring responsibility away from overburdened corrections 
officers.26 Instead, Sentul evolved into the idea of a rehabilitation centre for prisoners who were 
about to released, a hugely expensive facility not for the serious problem prisoners but for those 
who had cooperated enough to earn regular remissions. 
On 7 April 2014, the IPSC was formally inaugurated by President Yudhoyono. In late May, 
Maj. Gen. Agus said the deradicalisation centre was probably about two years away from being 
operational and lamented the fact that there was still no clear framework for its use.27 No one 
seemed to be happy with it: not Corrections, not the operations division of BNPT, which was left 
in the dark about plans, and not the prevention division itself. No one could explain what the 
purpose of a deradicalisation centre was in which Corrections had no role and which was not 
connected to any post-release monitoring program.
C. Visits of Middle Eastern Ulama
In December 2013, BNPT brought three Middle Eastern clerics to Indonesia: Ali Hasan al-Hala-
bi, a salafi cleric from Jordan; Dr Najih Ibrahim, one of the founders of the Jihad Group (Islamic 
Jihad)  in Egypt who spent 25 years in prison under Mubarak; and Hisyam an-Najjar, another 
Egyptian who had also been active in the Jihad Group and in the post-Arab Spring salafi polit-
ical party.28 All were opposed to bombings of civilians and to the tendency of extremist groups 
to brand Muslims who rejected the establishment of an Islamic state as infidels (kafir). BNPT 
was hoping they would have enough legitimacy in the extremist community to persuade some 
of the jihadis in prison to adopt their views. They spent five days in Indonesia, holding a three-
hour “course” for convicted jihadis in Cipinang Prison, Jakarta and in Pasir Putih  prison on the 
island of Nusakambangan, off the south coast of Java. They also took part in a conference at the 
University of Indonesia and were interviewed on national television.
The Egyptians were known and respected by senior JI prisoners, especially those who had 
trained on the Afghan border in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and the discussions in prison 
were reportedly lively. While the visits were predictably condemned on radical websites, BNPT 
considered them enough of a success to do another round. 29 Its staff are thus arranging with the 
governments of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan to choose another three clerics to visit prisons 
and universities and hold televised discussions.30 Senior prisoners in Cipinang Prison, however, 
said that while they enjoyed the discussions, the ulama had no impact on their views.31
25 “Pusat Perdamaian dan Keamanan Indonesia di Sentul Telan Biaya Rp.1.6T”, detik.com, 7 April 2014. It also included train-
ing facilities for peace-keeping forces, disaster relief, language training, a sports facility and the new campus of the National 
Defence University.
26 IPAC interview, Department of Corrections, Jakarta, 9 July 2014.
27 IPAC interview, Maj Gen. Agus Surya Bakti, BNPT, 5 May 2014.
28 The Jihad Group was an extremist splinter of the Muslim Brotherhood. It was responsible for the attack on tourists in Luxor 
in 1997. Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia modeled its founding charter on the group.
29 See, for example, “Beberapa Catatan atas Pemikiran ‘Ulama Deradikalisasi’ BNPT dari Timur Tengah”, arrahmah.com, 13 
December 2013 and “JAT: Undang Ulama Timur Tengah, BNPT Sedang Terapkan Teori Hitler”, islampos.com, 23 Decem-
ber 2013.
30 IPAC interview, Irfan Idris, BNPT, 5 June 2014.
31 IPAC interview, JI member,  Jakarta, 11 May 2014.
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Their BNPT hosts need to consider the pros and cons of these visits and whether clerics cho-
sen by the current military government in Egypt and an increasingly anti-Shi’a Saudi Arabia will 
be bringing the right messages to Indonesia or at least to understand the potential for additional 
agendas. They need to look at the impact of the first visit and whether it helped “deradicalise” 
anyone who was not already being convinced by the senior JI leaders in the prisons involved: 
Abu Dujana, Abu Husna, and Zuhroni alias Mbah, for example, were already encouraging fel-
low inmates to do a cost-benefit analysis of the use of violence. They were among the most 
enthusiastic about the visit of the ulama, but did the visit convince any sceptics? And finally, 
BNPT’s sponsorship of any visit immediately diminishes its effectiveness in the very community 
it wants to reach. If these visits are deemed to be worth continuing, it might be more useful to 
keep BNPT behind the scenes and get a sponsor that does not immediately raise suspicions in 
the target audience.
V. MOSQUES
BNPT correctly identifies mosques as one of the institutions where radicalisation takes place, 
but the challenge is how to distinguish the problem ones from the vast majority of the nearly 
800,000 mosques across the country.
It should not be a difficult task. Most arrested terrorism suspects are questioned in detail 
about how they came to join extremist groups, and many mention specific mosques where they 
took part in discussion groups or attended lectures by preachers who explicitly encouraged violent 
jihad. If a list of such places could be compiled from case dossiers, it could help focus thinking 
about how to approach the problem of mosque-based radicalisation. By contrast, the findings of 
the 2011 study by the NGO Lazuardi Birru that 50.95 per cent of mosques in the greater Jakarta 
metropolitan area had engaged in “radical action”, including 44 per cent by inciting hatred, may 
be  useful for showing a pattern of intolerance but less useful for programming because it em-
ploys too broad a definition of “radical”.32 
Information from case dossiers is much more specific. For example, one of the men arrest-
ed in connection with the plot to bomb the Myanmar embassy in Jakarta in May 2013 had 
attended jihadi lectures at five different mosques in the Jakarta area.33 Another man convicted 
of terrorism in connection with a Darul Islam cell based in Cileungsi, West Java, was part of a 
radical discussion group that moved around seven Jakarta area mosques.34 In both cases, one of 
the mosques cited was the Muhammad Ramadhan Mosque in south Bekasi, just east of Jakarta 
that in April 2014 was taken over by the Bekasi city government. The role of local officials was 
critical, but no counter-terrorism agencies were involved.
A. The Takeover of the Muhammad Ramadhan Mosque
The Muhammad Ramadhan Mosque for years had been known for its extremist preaching. 
Sandwiched between the police station (polsek) and the subdistrict (kecamatan) office of South 
Bekasi, it was the site of jihadi lectures, book launchings and fund-raising events, including in 
February 2014, for the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS). The story of how it came to be 
radicalised and deradicalised shows that constructive local resistance can work under certain 
32 See “TOR Program Nasional Pencegahan Terorisme 2014”, BNPT, p.9.
33 Trial dossier Sefriano. the Muhammad Ramadhan Mosque, in the Galaxi residential complex in Bekasi, west of Jakarta; the 
Baitul Karim Mosque in Kebon Kacang; the al-Muhajirin Mosque in Grogol, West Jakarta; and the mosque on the campus 
of the Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University in Ciputat, south of Jakarta.
34 The mosques were al-Mubarok in Krukut, West Jakarta; Mesjid Ramadhan, Bekasi; al-Hikmah, in Tanjung Barat, Lenteng 
Agung, South Jakarta; Baiturrahman in the Rancu Indah housing complex, Tanjung Barat, Lenteng Agung; Mushola al-Ji-
had in Cengkareng; Mesjid at-Taqwa in Tanah Abang; and the mosque in the Pertamina hospital, South Jakarta.
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conditions. The challenge is how to replicate those conditions.
The story begins in 2002 when residents of the Galaxi housing complex first began a cam-
paign for a new mosque. Eventually they were able to raise funds, and the mosque was built 
on Bekasi city government land designated for social and public facilities and “lent” through 
a permit to the mosque’s legal entity, the al-Anshar Foundation. The foundation appointed the 
first governing board (Dewan Kemakmuran Mesjid, DKM) and a local resident, Muhammad 
Nanang, was chosen as head for a five-year term, 2004-2009. Nanang, an active member of De-
wan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, the conservative religious outreach organisation, tended to-
ward salafi views, and the mosque hosted a number of well-known salafi preachers. Many in the 
surrounding community were not particularly happy because the ultra-puritan salafis disdained 
many of their traditional practices as un-Islamic. 
When Nanang’s term came to an end in 2009, the foundation suggested an election to choose 
his successor, but Nanang refused to leave, setting off a power struggle between the DKM  and 
the foundation. In the meantime, he had become attracted to salafi jihadism and began inviting 
well-known extremist clerics, including Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, to the mosque and encouraged dis-
cussions promoting jihad. He also stacked the mosque’s religious council, Dewan Syuro, with 
men sympathetic to his views, including Farid Okbah, known for his radical anti-Syi’ah preach-
ing, and Abu Jibril of the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, MMI). 
The radical constituency of the mosque was evident in a meeting on 29 June 2012, when the 
DKM stated that the mosque’s purpose was defending the faith against conversion efforts by 
Christians, and religious outreach based on salafism and jihad. The meeting was attended by 
Abu Jibril and nine other MMI members; Abu Abdillah of JAT; several members of the Bekasi 
Islamic Forum (Forum Umat Islam Bekasi) and representatives of several other hardline organ-
isations.35
Increasingly concerned, the foundation in January 2013 sent a letter to subdistrict officials 
asking for help in removing Nanang. The subdistrict head (camat) at the time was worried that 
intervening would lead to open conflict, and initially did not respond. As pressure increased, he 
held a series of meetings at the subdistrict office in May and June to listen to both sides, but the 
DKM was not interested in a compromise. In August 2013, a new camat, Drs Abi Hurairah was 
installed and together with a young pesantren-trained police chief (kapolsek), Commissioner 
Susilo Edy, a former investigator for Indonesia’s Anti-Corruption Commission, they decided to 
confront the radicals.
On 2 February, the mosque held a discussion of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s book, Tadzkirah (Ad-
vice) that the national police commander had just condemned as legitimising terrorism. Police 
chief Susilo, who frequently prayed at the mosque since it was just next door, was in attendance. 
He had sat quietly through the presentation of the main speakers, but stood up in the ques-
tion-and-answer session and said that if Ba’asyir could offer advice, so could he, and started to 
challenge the book. He was shouted down as an oppressor (thaghut, literally idolator).
Two weeks later on 17 February, in an unrelated incident, Susilo’s men arrested Adam Am-
rullah, one of the regular preachers at the mosque in a dubious criminal defamation case.36 That 
evening, dozens of angry activists from the mosque surrounded the South Bekasi police station, 
35 “Ikrar Penolakan Penggantian Nama Masjid dari Muhammad Ramadhan menjadi Al-Anshar” with list of signatories, 29 
June 2012. For more on the constellation of hardline groups in Bekasi, see International Crisis Group, “Indonesia: ‘Chris-
tianisation’ and Intolerance”, Asia Briefing No.114, 24 November 2010.
36 Adam Amrullah was accused of defaming an organisation that works as a civilian auxiliary of the police. The Center 
for Communication in Partnership with the Police (Sentra Komunikasi Mitra Polisi, SENKOM) claimed that Adam had 
defamed them in a 2013 video posted on Youtube by accusing SENKOM of being a front for Lembaga Dakwah Islam In-
donesia (LDII), an Islamic sect once closely linked to the Golkar party. Adam himself was a former member of LDII. He 
also accused Susilo Edy of being a member of the sect. In fact, as the SENKOM head himself acknowledged, SENKOM has 
occasionally provided security at LDII meetings.
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demanding Adam’s release, threatening violence and daring the police to shoot them. Nanang 
came to the scene and was able to persuade the crowd to disperse, although they returned the 
next day to surround the prosecutor’s office, throwing rocks. 
The physical threat against the police help push forward the decision to take back the mosque. 
There were two parts of the strategy, worked out among the camat, police chief and local reli-
gious leaders. One was to have a community show of force; the other was to use the govern-
ment’s ownership of the land on which the mosque was built to wrest legal control from the 
DKM.  On 22 February several religious leaders sent a formal request to the DKM to hold a cele-
bration of the Prophet’s birthday (Maulid) at the mosque. Signatories included Haji Abdul Hadi, 
who heads the local chapter of Forum Betawi Rempug (FBR), and Haji Cecep, who commands 
the local unit of the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI), the Islamist vigilante 
organisation. 37 The request was a direct challenge to the extremists: Salafis disapprove of Maulid 
because it was not celebrated in early Islam and they regard it as an unwarranted innovation 
(bid’ah). Because of the influence of Abdul Hadi and Haji Cecep in the community, however, 
they could not refuse. 
On 26 February, thousands gathered in front of the mosque for the celebration. Inside, sev-
eral DKM officials and radical activists had gathered to stand guard because they heard the 
mosque was going to be taken over. Some feared violence might erupt between the two sides, but 
a doctrinal compromise was worked out and the event concluded peacefully.38
Nanang and other extremists tried to find new allies to strengthen their hand against their 
increasingly confident opponents, even going to talk to FPI leader Habib Riziek directly. But 
they got little satisfaction, as he simply urged to find a way of preaching that did not offend other 
Muslims. They made a few concessions, hoping to avert any further action: for example, prom-
ising Nahdlatu Ulama leaders not to disrupt their practices and agreeing to a police request that 
the mosque’s most militant discussion group be disbanded.
In the meantime, the camat was busy working out the land issue in consultation with the 
foundation. On 3March, foundation officials sent a letter to the mayor (walikota) of Bekasi, with 
subdistrict officials copied in. In light of developments at the mosque that they feared could lead 
to wider conflict, they wrote, as well as the unhappiness of residents with the mosque manage-
ment, they were hereby turning the land and all the assets of the mosque over to the city govern-
ment and leaving it up to the city of Bekasi and the police to resolve the matter.39
On 16 April, Nanang received a phone call from the head of the municipal office of social af-
fairs, telling him that the DKM members would be replaced and that the foundation had turned 
over the mosque to the city government. Nanang’s protestations that the foundation had no 
authority to act were ignored.  On 20 April, backed by about 200 police, the Bekasi government 
formally took over the mosque replacing Nanang with Iskandar Ghozali, a Muhammadiyah 
leader, who was also on the board of the foundation. Dozens of FPI, FBR and youth groups 
from Nahdlatul Ulama and other organisations were on hand, but the camat later said that 
they were not important: the key thing was that police were out in force.40 The radicals tried to 
37 Both FBR and FPI are often mistakenly seen as ideologically akin to jihadis, but the membership of both is overwhelm-
ingly traditionalist, with many coming from Nahdlatul Ulama backgrounds. On this mosque issue, the membership 
was divided. Murhali Barda, a FPI leader in Bekasi who frequently sides with the extremists, was opposed to the Maulid 
celebration and reportedly angry that FPI members were obeying Abdul Hadi and not him.
38 In the compromise, DKM members acknowledged that rather than being absolutely forbidden, Maulid might be a case of 
legitimate differences of opinion (furu’iyah).
39 Letter signed by H. Abdul Kadir Marikar, head of the Yayasan Islam al-Anshar and Ir Ananto Wijaya, secretary to the wa-
likota of Bekasi, 3 March 2014. 
40 IPAC interview, Abi Hurairah, Bekasi, 11 June 2014. According to the camat, the FBR and FPI members who showed up 
were genuinely part of the community and not trucked in from outside or “encouraged” to be there by the local govern-
ment. Obviously, the government at any level should avoid working with organizations that use intimidation and violence 
against minorities, practice vigilantism and spread religious hatred.
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mobilise Islamist activists across the Jakarta metropolitan region to occupy the mosque after 
Friday prayers on 25 April. Only a few showed up, however, and some blamed Nanang for the 
failure, suggesting that faced with defeat, he had advised protestors not to attend. Backed by the 
Muslim Defence Team that provides legal aid to terrorist suspects, however, he has challenged 
the decision in court.
As of June 2014, the extremists have moved to a nearby smaller mosque, Mesjid al-Muhajirin, 
that the police consider an “embryo” of radicalism and are watching closely. The camat, embold-
ened by the success of the takeover, has called a meeting of all DKMs in South Bekasi to discuss 
how to prevent extremism from taking root in their mosques.
The case is instructive because it shows that extremist control of a major mosque can be suc-
cessfully challenged if the right elements are present, including determined local officials and 
powerful local religious leaders willing to sit down and think through a strategy before acting. 
Other factors that were critical were the DKM-foundation power struggle, and the use of land 
ownership as a tool to reclaim the mosque. It was a brilliant tactic to use the Maulid celebration 
as the occasion for a showdown, clearly showing local residents how the mosque could serve the 
community if it were back in traditionalist hands. At no time during the entire saga was there 
any contact with BNPT. 
B. The Case of Mesjid Jami, Krapyak, Klaten
The Bekasi mosque takeover was not an isolated event; it just got more publicity than usual. 
Across the country but particularly in Java, there are cases of local communities rejecting both 
salafis and salafi jihadis. In many cases, mosque authorities act before extremist control becomes 
entrenched, simply by telling radical preachers that their activities are unacceptable. This is what 
happened at the Mesjid Jami, Krapyak when it briefly became the site of a radical discussion 
group in 2008.
The group was led by Musab Abdul Ghofar alias Darwo of Yayaysan Kafayeh, the organisation 
behind the extremist publishing house, Kafayeh Media. He had close ties to Jemaah Islamiyah; 
the men around Noordin Top (responsible for the 2009 hotel bombings, later killed in a police 
operation); and a particularly militant faction of Darul Islam. Darwo came to the mosque for 
the first time at the invitation of the mosque governing council (DKM) that wanted to sponsor 
a regular pengajian for the community. Wahyu, one of the members who happened to be an ar-
dent admirer of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, was assigned to look for an appropriate teacher (ustadz). On 
the recommendations of several acquaintances, Wahyu chose Darwo, as he had good religious 
credentials, fluent Arabic and an understanding of the Qura’an and hadith.
The pengajian was open to anyone who wanted to attend. Wahyu himself invited a friend, 
Agung Jati Santoso, who was then a student at a state vocational high school (SMK Negeri 2) in 
Klaten, and Agung invited other classmates. Darwo showed jihadi videos and led discussions 
based on al-Qaeda writings and other extremist material.41 He called police who did not uphold 
Islamic law thaghut and he taught that jihad was an individual obligation (fardhu ‘ain) and that 
saluting the flag was idolatry. His fiery preaching made a deep impression on the high school 
students; Agung says he became “obsessed” with jihad after listening to him.42
Darwo’s teachings began to cause concern in the community. One person worried was Mu-
hammad Trisno Wardoyo, a policeman who was influential because his father had been the 
former village head. Trisno discussed the situation with Agus Sukarno, head of the DKM, who 
was also a lecturer at Veterans University, Yogyakarta. They agreed that elements of Darwo’s 
41  Case Dossier of Agung Jati Santoso bin Subandi, 27 January 2011.
42  Ibid.
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teachings seemed to condone terrorism.
They thus decided to disband the pengajian. Agus approached Darwo and asked him to hold 
his discussions elsewhere, saying that if he wanted to wage jihad he should go to Palestine. In 
this mosque, he said, Darwo was welcome to teach about jihad as the war against one’s own base 
instincts (hawa nafsu) but discussions of politics were forbidden.  Darwo then simply took his 
followers to another mosque, but they were evicted from that one, too.43 Some six months later, 
the students had formed a terrorist group called Tim Ightilayat (Assassination Team) led by a 
friend of Darwo’s. Darwo himself was never arrested.
Some of the same elements operative in Bekasi were present in Krapyak: an influential res-
ident and a divided mosque administration. The role of the DKM in all situations like this is 
critical but if they move against extremist groups, they need to know that they will have back-up 
from the community, local government and/or the police.
C. Lessons for BNPT
Ideally, the role of BNPT’s deradicalisation team should be to identify radical mosques, based at 
least in part on information from the case dossiers of convicted extremists—which the operations 
division can provide—and then help communities plan strategies to reclaim them. In some cases 
it may make sense just to reject the extremist preachers; in others, like Bekasi, a new mosque 
governing council may be needed. Community takeovers are not without risks, however, and 
there are a few tactics that should be specifically avoided, including anything that smacks of 
vigilantism. Sealing off extremist-led mosques by angry traditionalist mobs is no different than 
FPI doing the same to Ahmadiyah mosques or Christian churches.44 
BNPT could work with Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah to gather case studies of well-
planned mosque takeovers to understand what tactics have worked in different circumstances 
and why. It is also important to understand what specific extremist teachings triggered the de-
cision to act. The widespread branding of other Muslims as kafir seems to cause more outrage 
than anything specifically related to jihad, for example. These cases could provide important 
input for community outreach programs and would be more effective than a generic training 
program. BNPT, without publicity or fanfare, could also quietly put individuals involved in these 
takeovers in touch with community leaders in the areas served by radical mosques. 
It is also important in thinking about mosque strategies to look beyond the removal of ex-
tremists to longer-term prevention, so that they do not just pop up elsewhere. The effort of 
South Bekasi camat to alert other mosques to the problem and encourage them to find solutions 
is one useful example. It would be even better to have the camat and the police chief present 
their successful model to communities faced with similar problems.
43 Ibid. The second mosque was Mesjid Danguran, Klaten.
44 One case of vigilantism took place at the Al Ihsan Sabilillah mosque in Surabaya in June 2009. Originally a Muhammad-
iyah mosque, it fell into the hands of a radical retired policeman, Umar Ibrahim, from Dompu, Bima who happened to 
be the father of Muhammad Syaifudin Umar alias Abu Fida, a JI member arrested in 2004 for hiding Noordin Top but 
quickly released. As head of the mosque (takmir), Umar Ibrahim pulled it in an extremist direction to the point that many 
of its worshipers were members of JAT-Surabaya and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir was a regular preacher. Local residents, most of 
whom were members of Nahdlatul Ulama, grew angry at the frequent references in mosque sermons and discussions to 
civil servants, officials and anyone who took part in elections as kafir. Close to midnight on 19 June 2009, the day before a 
major event with Ba’asyir was scheduled, a mob sealed off the mosque and went to Umar Ibrahim’s house, demanding that 
he step down. Eventually he did so and the jihadis were forced out, but there was an unintended consequence. Because the 
community that forced out the jihadis was mostly Nahdlatul Ulama, its members did not want the old governing board 
from Muhammadiyah restored but wanted it controlled by Nahdlatul Ulama, creating new tensions.
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VI. PRISONS
Deradicalisation/disengagement initiatives run by the police or BNPT have not always been well 
coordinated with a Corrections prison reform program, yet logically, the two are linked. Better 
management of high-risk inmates and better prison security—elements of the prison reform 
program—should improve the chances that well-designed interventions aimed at individual 
prisoners will bear fruit.
As of May 2014, there were 278 convicted terrorists in 25 prisons across the country.45  Some 
100 others were in police custody, awaiting trial or on trial. Maximum security prisons had 
the largest populations, with 32 men in Cipinang Prison, Jakarta and 42 in Pasir Putih Prison, 
Nusakambangan. From the beginning, there has been concern that some of these detainees and 
prisoners would recruit ordinary criminals or prison personnel; cause problems in prison; or 
rejoin violent networks once released.46 But Corrections did not have the staff, training or infor-
mation to be able to make these assessments of who the potential troublemakers were, and the 
police officers who were in regular contact with some of the men they arrested were not always 
ready to sit down with prison staff to share information. 
In 2008, recognising that its problems were deeper and broader than just how to manage 
convicted terrorists, Corrections drafted a Blueprint for Prison Reform, in partnership with 
several NGOs and the Asia Foundation.47 The Blueprint became official policy in January 2009, 
and Corrections opened the door to donors and NGOs interesting in helping efforts to im-
prove prison management, security, data gathering and assessment of high-risk prisoners.  Some 
programs worked, some did not, but over time, a small group of mostly lower-ranking prison 
officials in charge of terrorist inmates became interested and knowledgeable about extremist 
networks. BNPT does not seem to have drawn on this knowledge in designing “deradicalisation” 
programs. However, more prisoners in any case may disengage on their own than through any 
formal program.
A.  “Self-Deradicalisation”
Prisoners can moderate their views in response to external events, leadership changes, new 
ideological teachings or family pressure. There has been much attention in counter-terrorism 
literature to self-radicalisation through the Internet; there has been little to “self-deradicalisa-
tion”, which can occur in the same way. Many prisoners can develop awareness on their own that 
the costs to themselves or their families of continued involvement in violence are too high. If 
relevant government agencies did more to understand how these “natural” processes occur, they 
might be better able to craft interventions aimed at encouraging the process.
1. Organisational Disengagement
The best example of an Indonesian jihadi organisation disengaging from violence is Jemaah Is-
lamiyah—although it may well prove to be temporary.  Some members never endorsed violence 
on Indonesian soil in the first place, and several senior members disagreed with the 2002 Bali 
bombings. Others came to the conclusion that violent acts in Indonesia were counterproductive, 
though not illegitimate. The post-Bali wave of arrests pushed them in this direction, as did their 
45 These figures are from the Corrections Directorate and do not include suspects arrested or on trial but not yet convicted 
or anyone else in police custody. They also do not include individuals linked to extremist groups who were charged with 
ordinary crimes. They do include a few people charged with terrorism who are not from jihadi groups, such as the members 
of Partai Aceh, charged with political murders before the 2009 election.
46 See IPAC, “Prison Problems: Planned and Unplanned Releases of Convicted Extremists in Indonesia”, 2 September 2013. 
47 Leo Sudaryono, “Reform at the Doorstep of Prisons in Indonesia,” In Asia (Asia Foundation bulletin), 10 August 2011.
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concern over unnecessary deaths of Muslims in the al-Qaeda style bombings carried out by their 
former colleague, Noordin Top. Abu Rusydan, the public face of JI since his release from prison 
in 2005, believed strongly that after the death of JI founder Abdullah Sungkar in 1999, the or-
ganisation had strayed from its main purpose—establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia. After 
a shootout with police in 2007 led to the deaths of 14 men and the arrests of more senior leaders, 
JI as an institution decided that for the time being, violence was counterproductive. 
The concerns of Rusydan and other leaders were reinforced by a number of revisionist ideo-
logical tracts from Middle Eastern jihadis that were obtained in Arabic, sometimes from Internet 
downloads, and translated into Indonesian. One particularly influential author was the Syrian 
al-Qaeda member Abu Mus’ab as-Suri who wrote in his 2004 book Da’wat al-muqawamah al-is-
lamiyah al-’alamiyah (Global Islamic Resistance Call) that Muslims needed to ask themselves 
three questions before undertaking any political act: Was the act in question permissible (halal) 
according to Islamic law? In light of political circumstances, would it benefit the Muslim com-
munity and the jihadi movement? And was it realistic, in terms of the resources and logistics 
needed?48 If the answer to any one of these questions was no, then the act should be considered 
forbidden, so that even if an act was theoretically sanctioned by Islamic law, it could be rendered 
haram by political and logistical weakness. As-Suri’s writings, translated and disseminated by 
JI intellectuals, led many in the organisation, including prisoners like Zuhroni (also known as 
Zarkasih and Mbah) and Abu Dujana, to apply a cost-benefit analysis to acts of violence in In-
donesia and conclude that the costs were too high. Some prisoners did such an analysis on their 
own, without any help from as-Suri, and came to the same conclusion.49
JI’s approach suggests that a fruitful approach to discussions with prisoners is not to bring in 
“moderate” outsiders, even less immoderate salafi ulama from the Middle East, for discussions 
on alternative interpretations of jihad, but quietly to encourage assessments of specific instances 
of past violence in terms of benefits achieved (manfaat) and harm done (mudhorat).  The more 
this is done through informal conversations rather than through structured discussions the bet-
ter. 
One thing Indonesian officials need to keep in mind is that rejection of violent jihad in In-
donesia does not mean rejection of the concept more generally. The same JI figures who are dis-
couraging jihad in Indonesia are contrasting it with Syria, which they see as a defensive jihad to 
protect Muslims under attack. A new JI military cell, training for Syria, was recently uncovered 
in Klaten, Central Java.50
2. Individual Disengagement
Indonesia has many cases of prisoners coming to the conclusion on their own that violence leads 
nowhere. The most systematic research on jihadi disengagement in Indonesia comes from stud-
ies conducted in Poso, Sulawesi, where researchers found many contributing factors, including 
their own cost-benefit analysis, as noted; new relationships with individuals outside jihadi cir-
cles; family pressures; changing personal and professional priorities; and disillusionment with 
tactics or leaders.51 
Prisoners who do disengage need positive reinforcement to stay that way. Good prison man-
agement can help, for example in understanding who to move in with whom or who needs to be 
48 In 2010, excerpts were published in Indonesian by Jazeera press in Solo under the title Visi Politik Gerakan Jihad but parts 
had been circulating in the jihadi community long before.
49 See for example Julie Chernov Hwang, Rizal Panggabean and Ihsan Ali Fauzi, “The Disengagement of Jihadis in Poso, 
Indonesia”, Asian Survey, Vol.53, No.4, 2013, p.764.  
50 “Arrests Reveal Jemaah Islamiyah’s Return, Police Source Says”, Jakarta Globe, 21 May 2014.
51 “The Disengagement of Jihadis in Poso, Indonesia”, op.cit, p.764.
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transferred to a different facility. Post-release assistance can also be useful: Yusuf Adhirama, a 
former prisoner, has become something of a media star as the cook in a cafe set up by an NGO 
in Semarang, Central Java. He made the decision on his own to disengage from violence, but he 
was also befriended by an enterprising former journalist who ensured he found employment 
after his release.52 The NGO in question, Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian, continues to provide 
some assistance to released prisoners. Other organisations and individuals also help out released 
prisoners, especially those with a record of good behaviour in prison, mostly on an ad hoc basis.
The danger comes in confusing good behaviour in prison with deradicalisation. As officials in 
Cipinang Prison in Jakarta found recently, a prisoner who may be a model inmate may be simply 
trying to get early release—and lying in the interests of a greater cause is wholly acceptable.53
C. Assessment of High-Risk Prisoners
While some prisoners seem to change their views after arrest, it is not always clear whether this 
is genuine or simply expedient, and officials agree that there needs to be a more objective tool 
for assessing the degree to which individuals constitute an ongoing security risk. Beginning in 
2011, Corrections officials experimented with a questionnaire first developed in Canada called 
VERA (Violent Extremist Risk Assessment), later modified for Indonesia and relabelled VERA-
2, with 31 risk indicators assessing beliefs and attitudes, intent, capability and commitment.54 
For a variety of reasons it was eventually discarded, but the desire to develop a tool for assess-
ment remains, and as of mid-2014, Corrections was testing a number of different instruments 
developed both inside and outside Indonesia. 
In countries where these questionnaires were developed, they are used in connection with 
voluminous data collected and analysed by law enforcement or prison intelligence officers. In 
Indonesian prisons, much of this information has been lacking, but efforts are now underway to 
ensure that more detailed information on prisoners’ background and networks is made available 
to prison staff. At the same time, staff are being encouraged to collect and analyse information 
about inmate activities, alliances and visitors. 
All of these developments should improve inmate management and lay the basis for better 
prison-based programs aimed at disengagement, but they urgently need to be supplemented 
by a more systematic and better-resourced post-release monitoring system, especially as many 
convicted prisoners finish serving their sentences and return home.55 From January 2013 to 
May 2014, 61 convicted Islamist extremists were released, together with twelve Christians, three 
Acehnese and four others arrested for bomb threats.56 
VII. COUNTERING EXTREMIST MEDIA
The spread of extremist teachings has been taking place for years via the print and broadcast 
52  See “Indonesian Scheme Serves Up New Life for Reformed Terrorist”, Financial Times, 10 June 2014, “Dari Teroris Jadi 
Koki,” Radio Netherlands, 16 June 2011; “Dari memegang sengata berganti wajan,”BBC, 11 October 2012; “Jalan Damai Yu-
suf Menuntaskan Jihad”, www.prasastiperdamaian.com, 2 December 2012; “Former terrorist-linked inmates helped back 
to life”, Jakarta Post, 29 December 2010 and many others. Yusuf was befriended by Noor Huda Ismail, now the executive 
director of an NGO called Yayasan Prastasi Perdamaian.
53  IPAC interview, official at Cipinang Prison, April 2014.
54  D. Elaine Pressman and John Flockton, “Calibrating risk for violent political extremists and terrorists: the VERA 2 struc-
tured assessment,” British Journal of Forensic Practice, Vol.14, No.4 2012.
55  See IPAC, “Prison Problems: Planned and Unplanned Releases of Convicted Extremists in Indonesia”, 2 September 2013. 
56  Data from Directorate of Corrections. The Christians were arrested in 2006 for killing two Muslim fish traders in Central 
Sulawesi as an act of retaliation for the judicial execution of three Christians accused of masterminding a massacre of 
Muslims at the height of the conflict in Poso. The three Acehnese were convicted of bombing the Jakarta Stock Exchange in 
2000. The two men and one woman accused of bomb threats had nothing to do with terrorist networks.
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media as well as the Internet. BNPT, in national terrorism program, lists the media as one of 
its target areas, with particular attention to developing “peace journalism” for journalists and 
editors and “dissemination of anti-terrorism themes” via print, broadcast and electronic media. 
Nothing in its program addresses the way social media is increasingly being used as a method of 
recruitment, indoctrination, training and funding.
A. Resistance, not Vigilantism
One way to fight back against extremism in the print and broadcast media is through the Press 
Council (Dewan Pers). One instructive example is Program Khazanah Islam on the Trans 7 
television channel. The program was fairly popular given the variety of morning programs with 
a 15 per cent share of the viewing audience in December 2013.57  Many Muslim viewers, how-
ever, saw it as provocative and extreme. On 26 February 2014, for example, it had a discussion 
about ashabul rayati suud or the black banners of Khorasan, cited in various hadith or Prophetic 
traditions as being the flags carried by the troops of the Islamic messiah, the Imam Mahdi, when 
the final victory of Islam is at hand. It suggested that jihadi groups like al-Qaeda, ISIS and the 
al-Nusra Front were part of these troops, because they carried black flags.
By the time the discussion was aired, Khazanah had already been the subject of several pro-
tests to the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission (Komisi Penyiaran Indonesia, KPI) because 
it was seen as divisive and exclusivist. For example, several Nahdlatul Ulama leaders registered 
a protest about a discussion on 12 April 2013 that condemned several traditional prayers and 
practices of the Nahdlatul Ulama community as impure accretions not practiced by the Prophet 
and his Companions. The program had aired similar condemnations in previous programs.58 
On 17 April, the KPI convened a “mediation” meeting between the Nahdlatul Ulama leaders, 
including Habib Fachry who is also a senior figure in FPI, and the Trans 7 editors. The Nahdlatul 
Ulama delegation said the program was too influenced by Wahabism; the Trans 7 team apolo-
gised and said they would pay closer attention to its content.59
For a few months, there were no complaints. Then, on 31 October 2013, at the height of 
a debate in Indonesia over Shi’ism in Islam, the program aired a highly tendentious segment 
called “Understanding Shi’ism” that suggested that Shi’a were not true Muslims. Not a single 
Indonesian Shi’a was interviewed or quoted. Instead, the sources included the ultraconservative 
Bachtiar Nasir, a Saudi-trained scholar who served, together with other Middle Eastern alumni, 
as an adviser to Khazanah Islam.60
The Indonesian Shi’a community was outraged and reported the program to the Press Coun-
cil. Initially Trans 7 ignored their complaint, believing that the Press Council had no authority 
over the program, because Khazanah “was not journalism”.61 But the Press Council saw the 
matter differently. It said Khazanah was a feature program that purported to be based on field 
research and interviews, so the content had to accord with the journalistic code of ethics. After 
reviewing the October program, the Council concluded that it had violated several elements of 
57 “Khazanah Sepuluh Kali Diprotes”, Suara Hidayatullah, No.8, Desember 2013
58 The 12 April 2013 program criticized two kinds of prayer, shalawat badr and shalawat nariyah. A program on 2 April 2013 
had criticized doa and tawasul. On 14 November 2012, the practice of visiting graves (ziarah kubur) came under fire. All are 
traditional practices of Nahdlatul Ulama that are frowned on by the salafi community as unwarranted innovations (bid’ah).
59 Available at www.youtube.com/watch?v=79c3PQv135s. See also www.sarkub.com/2013/kesaksian-tim-sarkub-di-kpi-mem-
bungkam-jurnalisme-abal-abal-wahabi/.  Those present on the Nahdlatul Ulama side include KH Thobari, head of Lajnah 
Falakiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama Banten; Habib Fachry Jamalulail; KH Misbachul Munir from Lembaga Dakwah Nahdlatul 
Ulama and Habib Mustofa Mohsen al Jufri.
60 Bachtiar Nasir is also a founder of the hardline Council of Young Muslim Intellectuals and Scholars of Indonesia (Majelis 
Intelektual dan Ulama Muda Indonesia, MIUMI), together with Farid Okbah, the anti-Shi’a cleric who features in the dis-
cussion of the Muhammad Ramadhan mosque in Bekasi. He also sits on the executive council of Muhammadiyah.
61 “Khazanah Sepuluh Kali Diprotes”, Suara Hidayatullah, op. cit..
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the code because it was unbalanced , used unsourced photographs and was guilty of anti-group 
discrimination.62 It called on the television station to give the Shi’a a right of reply and do a thor-
ough evaluation of the program so that these violations did not recur.
A few days earlier, on 17 January, perhaps knowing an unfavourable ruling would be issued, 
Khazanah had a special program on the Prophet’s birthday, which as noted above, salafi Muslims 
do not celebrate. One of the discussants was Jalauddin Rakhmat, head of the Shi’a community. 
As a result of the pressure on Trans 7, the program’s editors modified some but not all of its 
content. It avoids direct criticism of other Muslims on the show, but its messages on Twitter 
continue to be provocative and have expressed support for ISIS.
The use of the Press Council is a case of constructive resistance, even if it was less than fully 
successful, because it used existing institutions and objective standards—in this case the code of 
ethics—to force a national television station to moderate (somewhat) an extremist broadcast on 
grounds of discrimination. 
Another, less positive case took place in Batam in January 2014 when traditionalist groups, 
led by Nahdlatul Ulama but also involving the local FPI chapter, mobilised against Radio Hang 
106FM, a salafi station. The station frequently broadcast discussions and sermons criticizing 
traditional practices, reflecting longstanding hostility between the puritans and the traditional-
ists. The local religious affairs office on 28 December 2013 had tried to mediate by sponsoring 
a dialogue between leaders of the two sides on several key points of doctrines. Both sides were 
convinced they had won, which only made things worse. On 17 January 2014, the traditionalists 
held a demonstration in front of the local Broadcasting Commission branch (KPID) to demand 
that Radio Hang be closed down. “If the KPID doesn’t shut Radio Hang, we’ll shut it down 
ourselves,” one protestor warned.63 The threats worked. A week later, Radio Hang apologised to 
fellow Muslims for any offence caused and said it would no longer broadcast anything that could 
give rise to intergroup tension and would invite non-salafi preachers on its shows.The difference 
here is vigilantism, a mob forcing resolution of an issue through threats and intimidation, es-
pecially when the KPID failed to act. This is not a constructive method to deal with extremism, 
but it legitimises vigilantism against other groups. The Broadcasting Commission could be a 
much more effective body than it is, but on many cases involving religion, it reportedly has been 
reluctant to act. 
It is also worth noting, especially because of the reliance of the BNPT on “dialogues”, how the 
dialogue attempted in this case actually raised tensions rather than lowering them. 
B. Victim Voices
Terrorism victims and their families, strategically deployed, can be a powerful tool in raising 
awareness of the costs of terrorism. Two organisations of bombing survivors have emerged in 
Indonesia, the Survivors Foundation (Yayasan Penyintas) and the Association for Victims of 
Terrorism Bombings in Indonesia, ASKOBI). They are working with the Alliance for a Peaceful 
Indonesia (Aliansi Indonesia Damai, AIDA), an organisation focused on encouraging victims 
to share their stories more broadly.64 Both have members who have taken part in school and 
university programs, in a way that has proved to have an emotional impact on the audience. 
Neither receives funding from BNPT but the agency recognises the power of victim voices and 
62 “Penilaian dan Rekomendasi (PPR) Dewan Pers Nomor: 02 /PPR-DP/I/2014”, January 2014.
63 “Siaran Hang FM Dilaporkan ke KPID”,  Batam Pos, 17 January 2014. The demonstrators included the Forum Takmir Mes-
jid dan Mushala Kota Batam, FPI, Banser NU, GP Anshor, PMII, Forum Habaib, and others.
64 The founders of AIDA include Indonesian academic, civil society and religious leaders, guided by Ahmad Syafii Maarif, 
former chairman of Muhammadiyah and assisted by Dutch businessman Max Boon who lost his legs in the 2009 Jakarta 
hotel bombings. 
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has encouraged the organisations’ activities.
Bringing convicted terrorists face to face with victims and their families can also be effective, 
particularly if the victims are Muslim. One of the biggest issues between JI and its more militant 
critics after JI decided that violence on Indonesian soil was counterproductive was over the 
deaths of innocent Muslims. JI argued that such collateral damage might be acceptable if Indo-
nesia were under occupation or attack. But in the absence of such dire circumstances, it made 
no sense.65 
The impact of bringing victim and perpetrator together was evidence in 2013, when Umar 
Patek, one of the original Bali bombers, captured in Pakistan in 2011 and returned to Indonesia, 
was brought together with some of his Indonesian victims. He was reportedly shocked at what 
they had suffered and said he knew he could never enter heaven without their forgiveness. The 
emotional punch of that meeting may have contributed to Patek’s moderation, to the point that 
he never became the champion of Indonesian extremists that some of his former colleagues 
hoped or that Indonesian officials feared. Inside prison, he preaches that jihadi actions are only 
acceptable when Muslims are under direct attack.66
C. Counter-narratives
Radical websites continue to proliferate in Indonesia, with messages encouraging the use of 
force that may be all the more attractive given the recent victories of ISIS forces in Iraq and Syr-
ia.67 Closing Internet sites is a largely futile exercise given the ease with which sites can reappear, 
and the vast majority of what gets posted on extremists sites is not against any Indonesian law 
anyway. 
Challenging the content may be a better way to go but it has to be done in a far more sophis-
ticated way than has been done by government agencies thus far. One avenue is to make use of 
debates within the jihadi community itself. But this can only be done through a combination 
of individuals who follow ideological debates closely enough to understand the significance of 
what they mean for the jihadis, and experts with the technical skills of running social media 
campaigns to know how to package messages for particular audiences.
After JI withdrew from violence in 2007, for example, its leaders used four major arguments 
against actions on Indonesian soil: 
• they were counterproductive. Leaders like Abu Rusydan, Abu Dujana and Zuhroni alias 
Mbah urged their followers to do a cost-benefit analysis to understand that the costs were 
too heavy. If bombings led to the arrests of key leaders and the weakening of the organi-
sation, how did that help the establishment of an Islamic state? One jihadi writer, looking 
back at a decade of bombings, argued that the political achievements of the jihadists at 
home amounted to nothing.68
• they lacked community support. JI leaders argued that Indonesia was not Iraq, it could not 
build on the resentment of the populace toward a hated occupier. For most Indonesians, 
terrorist attacks made no sense, so the jihadi community needed to intensify its outreach 
and education to build a mass base. Also, there was something wrong with the jihad if the 
country’s best and brightest professionals were not interested in joining.69
65 See buletinalhikmah.wordpress.com/m-d-u-i/, cited in International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Jihadi Surprise in Aceh, Asia 
Report No.189, 20 April 2010.
66 IPAC interview with official at Porong Prison, April 2014.
67 Indonesians and the Syrian Conflict, IPAC Report No. 6, 30 January 2014.
68 Refleksi Jihad Aceh, available at elhakimi.wordpress.com, 22 March 2010.
69 Ibid. See also Ali Imron, Sang Pengebom, Jakarta, November 2007.
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• the enemy was too powerful. One only had to look at how easily Detachment 88 was able 
to kill terrorist suspects, wrote one Indonesian jihadi in 2010. It made no sense to go to 
war against foreigners or even the Indonesian state unless there was a reasonable chance 
that the jihadi political mission could be achieved or that the enemy could be weakened. 
In fact, the search for martyrdom was too often driven by selfish personal motives and 
ultimately did not help the Muslim community. 70
•  innocent Muslims were being unnecessarily killed. This last has consistently been the most 
powerful argument used by “jihadi revisionists” like Jordan’s Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi 
against al-Qaeda-style attacks. In Indonesia in 2010, one JI scholar wrote that if Indone-
sian Muslims were under attack and had to respond, maybe it would be understandable 
if some Muslims died in the process. But was the situation in Indonesia really so dire that 
Muslim blood had to be shed?71 Five years later, anti-ISIS jihadis, including JI, are still 
using the issue of unnecessary Muslim deaths to argue against ISIS on the grounds of its 
brutality toward other Muslims, including rival groups.
Three aspects of these arguments are noteworthy. First, no one tried to argue against the 
interpretation of jihad as physical battle or suggest that violence was illegitimate per se. Second, 
the arguments were probably only persuasive to the extent they were delivered by extremist 
leaders to their followers; had the same arguments been made by someone known to be working 
with BNPT, or even Nahdlatul Ulama, they would lose much of their impact. The message is 
important, but so is the messenger. Third, all four arguments were aimed at those who wanted 
engage in violence at home. They would have no impact on discouraging young men from going 
to Syria, indeed, JI leaders see fighting in Syria as obligatory for all Muslims, although not all 
agree on which group to support.
A more recent example of an intra-jihadi debate involves the practice of declaring all police 
to be thaghut or kafir because they served in the defence of an idolatrous state, an idea derived 
from the writings of Egyptian radical Abdul Qadir bin Abdul Aziz, better known in the West as 
Dr. Fadl.72 According to the principle known as takfir mu’ayyan, however, one must look at the 
individuals, not at the institution, before such a damning pronouncement can be made. 
This revisionist view began circulating in late 2012-2012, including on the radical website ar-
rahmah.com.73  It was based on a book by Abu Yahya al Libi, a senior al-Qaeda official who in the 
late 1990s had become deeply concerned over the tendency of some jihadis to too easily brand 
70 For a longer analysis of these arguments, see International Crisis Group, “The Dark Side of Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid”, Asia 
Briefing No.107, 6 July 2010, pp.7-8.
71 MDUI website, available at buletinalhikmah.wordpress.com/m-d-u-i/, cited in International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Ji-
hadi Surprise in Aceh, Asia Report No.189, 20 April 2010.
72 The original argument that all defenders of idolatrous states were thaghut or kafir came from an Egyptian extremist known 
in the West as Dr. Fadl and in Indonesia as Abdul Qadir bin Abdul Aziz, real name Sayyed Imam al-Sharif. He has since 
renounced his more extremist views and is probably the best-known jihadi revisionist. A book written before that renun-
ciation, Al-Jami’ fi Thalabil Ilmi Asy-Syarif,  known in English as The Compendium of the Pursuit of Divine Knowledge, 
was published in translation in Indonesia in 2004. In it, Dr Fadl wrote that the companions of the Prophet had agreed that 
all thaghut defenders should be branded as infidels and that therefore succeeding generations could not decide otherwise 
or they too would be considered kafir. Many Indonesian jihadis, following Dr Fadl, adopted the principle that whoever did 
not declare a kafir as such was himself a kafir, whose blood was halal, i.e. could be killed. See Abdul Qadir Abdul Aziz, “Sta-
tus  Aparat Ansharut Thogut, Dari Kalangan Tentara, Polisi, Inteligent dan Ulama Su’u” (a translation of chapter 10 of  The 
Compendium), translated by Aman Abdurrahman, 2004, for Tauhid wal Jihad (online publishers). Dr Fadl had originally 
worked with al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawaheri in the organisation Islamic Jihad. They became bitter rivals, however, and 
Dr Fadl today is known for his attacks on al-Qaeda.This does not seem to have bothered the Indonesian jihadis who swear 
by his pre-revisionist writings.
73 See “Serial kajian tentang takfir muayyan” on www.arrahmah.com beginning 23 May 2012. This website, which was once 
among the most radical, changed after its owner, Muhammad Jibriel, was arrested on terrorism charges in August 2009. 
Its onetime editor, Fachry, left and set up a more radical site, al-mustaqbal.net. Since Jibriel’s arrest and Fachry’s departure, 
arrahmah has  been noticeably milder and now is one of the leading critics of ISIS in the Islamist community.
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fellow Muslims as kafir and therefore as enemies to be killed. He was particularly upset by the 
indiscriminate killing of police, soldiers and their entire families by Jama’ah Islamiyah Musalla-
hah, an Algerian jihadi group that justified its savagery by reference to Dr Fadl’s book. They also 
used it to justify killing anyone who refused to join them.74 Once in Afghanistan, he also wrote 
a book in which he rejected the methods by which Dr Fadl had reached his conclusions and in 
a complicated analysis, argued that just because someone was part of a thaghut institution did 
not necessarily make him or her a legitimate target for assassination.75 Some jihadis led by Abu 
Dujana, basing their reasoning on Abu Yahya’s writing, therefore concluded that the practice of 
Indonesian jihadis to targeting all police just because they did for failing to apply Islamic law was 
unjustified.  Aman Abdurrahman, however, continued to cite Dr. Fadl approvingly, leading Abu 
Dujana to accuse him of being a takfiri or mutashadid (extremist).76
These intra-jihadi debates need to be studied with care to see how they can be used, and with 
whom. Part of the problem with the work on counter-narratives thus far is that there has been 
insufficient attention to the different audiences that messages have to reach or which messengers 
have credibility with what groups and for how long. Nasir Abas, for example, a former JI com-
mander who went to work for the police, was extremely effective with JI prisoners for the first 
few years after the Bali bombs, when he still commanded respect among his former comrades. 
But his influence waned over time, and it is virtually non-existent with the current generation of 
would-be terrorists, most of whom have no connection to JI. A group of former Afghan veter-
ans, most of them former JI members, may have credibility with some groups but just sending 
them out into the community to preach may not be an effective use of funds.
Salafi arguments against salafi jihadism, of which there are many, may be useful in persuad-
ing members of non-terrorist Islamist groups—members of anti-vice campaigns, for example—
from crossing over into the jihadi camp. They will be less useful in traditionalist communities 
that jihadis have penetrated. There, communities are unlikely to differentiate between salafi 
and salafi jihadi, seeing both as unacceptable because of their ultrapuritan teachings (indeed, a 
strong anti-salafi backlash is evident in many parts of Indonesia). The community in Bekasi was 
most offended by extremist rejection of their traditional practices—a rejection propagated by 
salafi and salafi jihadi alike. 
A much better use of funds would be to hire a political consultant familiar with the use of 
social media in election campaigns to understand how messages are tested, audiences are target-
ed and campaigns prepared. This consultant could work with experts on intra-jihadi debates to 
plan campaigns targeted at some of the audiences the government wants to reach, including the 
congregations of known radical mosques.
VIII.  CONCLUSIONS 
No country in the world has found a fully successful method for preventing violent extremism, 
although many have developed programs that seem to help in a local context. Indonesia deserves 
credit for managing its extremism problem as well as it has, although it has been enormously 
aided by a peaceful domestic environment and friendly neighbours. But there is much more it 
could be doing to build on existing knowledge so that counter-radicalisation interventions can 
be designed based on hard data about radicalisation. 
A new government coming in might consider radically restructuring BNPT to ensure that 
74 These included a friend of Abu Yahya’s, Athiyatullah Al-Libi, another al-Qaeda leader, who barely escaped from Algeria 
with his life.
75 Abu Yahya Al Libi, Ramai-ramai mengkafirkan para pembela thaghut, haruskah mengkafirkan setiap personilnya?” a trans-
lation of Nazharat fi Al-Ijma’ Al-Qath’I , Manjanik Media, Solo, October 2012. 
76 IPAC disucssion with JI members, April 2014.
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the people involved in collecting intelligence on terrorist networks—including not just police 
but also prison officials—are also involved in the design of deradicalisation and counter-radical-
isation programs. The National Terrorism Prevention Taskforce was a good idea but realistically, 
line ministries like Education have no one at senior levels with detailed knowledge of terrorist 
networks and therefore they do not necessarily know what problems the Education Ministry 
could solve. The fact that most extremist groups of any size maintain their own kindergartens, 
for example, is one such problem that the ministry could take on, perhaps through new policies 
on certification.
Communities across Indonesia are pushing back against extremists in different ways, but 
no one in BNPT is systematically collecting information on how, why and where this has taken 
place and what lessons can be learned. Where Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama commu-
nities have taken back schools and mosques from extremist—not necessarily violent extremist—
groups, what tactics have they used? If a list of 25 mosques hosting extremist discussion groups 
was drawn up from terrorist testimonies, and then discussions held with community leaders 
about what tactics might be applied from Muhammadiyah or Nahdlatul Ulama experiences that 
worked elsewhere, perhaps the successful pushbacks could be replicated.  The problem is that at 
present, the prevention programs seem to be thought up in Jakarta without much reference to 
concrete cases, thus diminishing their chances of success.
The last five years have seen few terrorist attacks in Indonesia but there has still been exten-
sive recruitment of would-be mujahidin and many foiled plots. With the number of Indonesians 
fighting in Syria now believed to be over 100, the current lull could change when they begin to 
return. Prevention is more important than ever.
INSTITUTE FOR POLICY ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT (IPAC)
The Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) was founded in 2013 on the principle 
that accurate analysis is a critical first step toward preventing violent conflict. Our mission 
is to explain the dynamics of conflict—why it started, how it changed, what drives it, who 
benefits—and get that information quickly to people who can use it to bring about positive 
change. In areas wracked by violence, accurate analysis of conflict is essential not only 
to peaceful settlement but also to formulating effective policies on everything from good 
governance to poverty alleviation.
We look at six kinds of conflict: communal, land and resource, electoral, vigilante, extrem-
ist and insurgent, understanding that one dispute can take several forms or progress from 
one form to another. We send experienced analysts with long-established contacts in the 
area to the site to meet with all parties, review primary written documentation where 
available, check secondary sources and produce in-depth reports, with policy recommen-
dations or examples of best practices where appropriate.
We are registered with the Ministry of Social Affairs in Jakarta as the Foundation for Pre-
venting International Crises (Yayasan Penanggulangan Krisis Internasional); our website 
is www.understandingconflict.org.
